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Academic Leadership Journal
Introduction
While coaches in the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) are under tremendous pressure to deliver
winning seasons, they are certainly well compensated for their efforts. In 2007 there were over fifty
coaches making more than $1 million per season, and a dozen of them were paid over $2 million. Only
five coaches had made over $1 million per season in 1999. In that same year, the average
compensation for 182 university presidents and chancellors was a little more than $397,000 (Wieberg
& Upton, 2007), underscoring where the priorities are on today’s big-time college campuses. In spite of
the current economic recession, coaches continue to seek more lucrative contracts, led by Mack Brown
of Texas, who secured a $5 million per-year deal late in 2009, just slightly more lucrative than the
contract of Nick Saban of Alabama, who scored a one-year extension to a deal that will pay him $4.7
million annually.
The coach being the program’s leader both on the field and in the classroom is evident when
examining common provisions in most coach’s contracts. Contracts typically contain provisions for
incentives based on the academic performance of players; however, the bonuses tend to be a tiny
fraction of the total compensation. Some provisions represent very low expectations, such as simply
avoiding sanctions based on the NCAA’s Academic Progress Rate. Others contain provisions that are
nearly impossible to achieve, such as having a 100 percent graduation rate for a program that typically
hovers around 45 percent every year (Fountain & Finley, 2008; Luebchow, 2008).
Many coaches report that academic incentives would have to be considerably higher and that the
culture of college football would have to drastically change for them to amend their practices of studentathlete recruitment. According to Georgia coach Mark Richt, “The bottom line is, if you don’t win, you
are going to get fired” (Eichelberger and Levinson, 2007, p. 1). Richt went on to say that he would
recruit more academically prepared players if half his pay was based on academic performance, but
that they might not be able to play and he would “get canned because you can’t play on the field”
(Eichelberger and Levinson, 2007, p. 1). Phil Hughes, an associate athletic director at Kansas State
University called the incentives a public relations shell game and said, “It’s a feel good story that
suggests we somehow care about this” (Eichelberger and Levinson, 2007, p. 1). Dennis Howard, a
business professor at Warsaw Sports Marketing Center at the University of Oregon has studied
coaching contracts and incentives and concluded that he would “like to see coaches made accountable
for G.P.A.s and graduation rates. Perhaps football-related bonuses would be activated only when
coaches meet the academic standards. Then the school’s first responsibility would be to make the
players graduate” (Sandomir, 2007, p.1).
In an effort to better encourage increased graduation rates, the NCAA introduced the Academic
Progress Rate (APR) in 2004 (Lapchick, 2007). The APR was intended to act as a real-time measure
of academic progress, awarding points for athletes who remain in good academic standing and

remain at an institution. According to the NCAA, teams that chronically under-performed on the APR
measure could be subject to practice restrictions, loss of scholarships, postseason bans and restricted
membership status (NCAA, 2010). Nathan Tublitz, co-chair of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics,
is one of many academicians concerned that the APR will lead to a game of “catch us if you can,” as
athletic departments seek creative ways to keep student-athletes eligible to avoid loss of scholarships
(Yost, 2008, p. D10).
As concerns about sanctions due to APR scores increase, academic attention returned to examining
programs for signs of academic clustering, defined as having 25 percent or more of the athletes on one
team enrolled in a single academic major (Case, Greer, & Brown, 1987). Clustering is widespread
among Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) programs, including schools in the Big Ten (Nash, 2008), the
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) (Fountain & Finley, 2009a), and occurs among some poorly
performing programs as well as top tier programs (Finley & Fountain, 2007). Most concerning was the
evidence that clustering at a number of schools was significantly more widespread among AfricanAmerican football players than among their White counterparts (Fountain & Finley, 2009b). Five
schools in the ACC had over half their African-American football players enrolled in a single major in
2006, and almost every school in the conference showed evidence of clustering African-Americans
more densely into a single major than the White players (Fountain & Finley, 2009a).
In the addition to the APR, the NCAA developed the Graduation Success Rate (GSR) to assess the
academic success of student-athletes using a metric that the NCAA deemed more accurate than the
federal graduation rate. The GSR, unlike the federal rate, accommodates for transfer students and
midyear enrollees. Under the GSR, schools are not penalized for outgoing transfers who are in good
academic standing in spite of the fact that they will not graduate from the institution. As a result, the
GSR for NCAA member institutions and NCAA student-athletes as a whole is always higher than the
federal graduation rate. For example, while the GSR for NCAA athletes entering college in 2002 was
reported as 79 percent (an all-time high), the federal rate for the same cohort was only 64 percent. The
NCAA began collecting GSR data with the freshman class of 1995, with data being available for each
cohort six years after initial enrollment. Similarly, the federal rate allows a student to complete a degree
within a six-year window.
Male student-athletes lag behind females in graduation success (72 percent and 88 percent,
respectively for the 2009 GSR). For the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), the 2009 GSR was 66
percent (55 percent using the federal rate). NCAA Interim President Jim Isch expressed “modest
concern” regarding the scores for football, which had declined slightly from the previous year (NCAA,
2009, p. 1).
In spite of recent improvements in GSR scores (likely attributable to academic clustering in some
cases), African-American student-athletes still lag behind their White counterparts, and the gap is
substantial for some football programs. Richard Lapchick, Director of The Institute for Diversity and
Ethics in Sport notes that in spite of recent improvement “race remains a continuing academic issue
even for student-athletes. This is reflected in the gaps between graduation rates for white and AfricanAmerican student-athletes. This is an issue that we still need to address on our campuses” (Lapchick,
2009, p. 2).
Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to identify and discuss the coaches and programs that have been
successful on the field over the past five years, qualifying for bowl game participation, while
simultaneously having low graduation rates for African-American players. The contractual incentives for
athletic and academic achievement included in the coaches’ contracts are also presented for
discussion purposes.
Methodology
The study was limited to successful football programs in the Football Bowl Subdivision from the 2005 to
2009 seasons, which had the same coach in place for a minimum of eight seasons and had a
graduation success rate for African-American players lower than 50 percent (average over the five
years in the study). Football program success was defined by qualification to participate in a postseason bowl game in a minimum of four of the five seasons in the study.
The eight year minimum tenure for the coach was selected because it established that the coach had
been in place for several seasons prior to the first graduation date for the study and had, therefore,
recruited a majority of the student-athletes involved. The researchers believed that eight years at one
school was sufficient to give the coach ownership of the program, both regarding on-field success
(qualifying for bowls) and for graduation rates. The cutoff for graduation success rates for AfricanAmerican players (50 percent) was subjectively selected because it reflected performance that is
considerably worse than the average GSR (58 percent in 2009) for African-American football players at
the Division I level.
Results
Forty-three schools qualified to play in a bowl game in at least four of the five years in the study. Of
those, 13 had the same coach for the required eight years or more. Seven of those 13 programs failed
to have more than 50 percent of its total African-American players graduate over the five year period.
Thus, seven schools qualified for this study: California, Fresno State, Georgia, Missouri, Ohio State,
Oklahoma, and Texas. Three of the seven coaches had served for nine years; three others had been at
their institutions for 11, 12, and 13 years. Only one of the seven coaches met the minimum requirement
set for length of tenure (eight years) to be included in the study. These lengths of tenure supported that
the selected group should be considered to “own” the results for their respective teams. Results
represent the 2005 to 2009 football seasons and graduation success rates published by the NCAA
from 2005 to 2009.
Athletic Success
As defined by the criteria for inclusion in the study, all the coaches had significant on-field success
(Table 1), with six of the seven qualifying for five bowl games over the five-year period. Only Pat Hill of
Fresno State missed a bowl game in one of the seasons. Winning percentages ranged from .593
(Gary Pinkel) to .826 (Mack Brown). Four of the seven coaches had qualified for a bowl game in every
season coached at their current school. As a result of their consistent production of winning teams, the
salaries ranged from just under $1 million to $5 million annually. The seven coaches in the study
received a total of over $22.2 million in 2009 in annual salary (DeBarros, Dougherty, Evans, Newman,
& Palmer, 2009).

Academic Failure
Unlike the success these coaches
have attained on the field, the
leadership these coaches have
shown toward academic
achievements of their players has
been lacking (Table 2). All of the
programs had average GSRs under
56% over the five-year period, with
four programs graduating less than
50 percent of all its players.
Graduation Success Rate scores
for white players ranged from 52 to
74 percent, whereas scores for
African-American players ranged
from 34 to 49 percent. As a result,
there were substantial gaps in GSR
between White and African-American players at several institutions. The narrowest gaps occurred at
schools with relatively low GSR scores for White players (Fresno State, California, and Oklahoma).
Larger gaps, ranging from 26 to 38 percent were evident at Missouri, Ohio State and Georgia. At each
of those institutions the GSR for White players was over 73 percent, compared to scores ranging from
36 to 47 percent for African-American players. Texas stood out as having low GSR scores for White
players (59 percent), extremely low scores for African-American players (34 percent), and a large (25
percent) gap between the two groups. It should be noted that Texas has had the greatest on-field
success of teams qualifying for the study over the last several years, including appearances in the Bowl
Championship Series (BCS) National Title Game twice in the years considered in this study.
Contractual Incentives
Beyond base pay, every coach
in the study had a contract that
stipulated additional money for
specified achievements. The
top performance bonus for 5 of
the 7 coaches in the study was
winning the BCS
Championship (Table 3). The
reward for winning the BCS
Championship ranged from
$250,000 to $1 million. The two
other top performance bonuses
were for playing in the BCS
Championship game (Jim
Tressel, $200,000) and having an undefeated season (Pat Hill, $100,000). As other studies have

demonstrated, many top academic bonuses are virtually impossible to reach without a major shift in
priorities (Fountain & Finley, 2008). Even in the event that coaches prioritize academics and reach the
top academic-based incentive, the addition to their total compensation is minimal, generally worth no
more than 3 percent of the total value of the contract.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that
there are several coaches in
the FBS who make
considerable incomes
based on athletic success,
while failing to ensure that
their student-athletes
produce in the classroom
and earn degrees.
Particularly problematic are
the low graduation rates of
African-American players
and the disparity between
their GSR scores and those
of their White counterparts.
In spite of these academic
failings, coaches continue to
command greater salaries
and reverence on their campuses as great leaders. According to University of Texas President William
Powers Jr., as he explained awarding a $5 million contract to his head coach, “Mack Brown has built
one of the nation’s premier football programs, and he’s brought credit to our university,” and “He has
done an outstanding job, and in the time he’s been here, he has generated millions of dollars in new
revenue” (Halliburton, 2009, p. 1). The academic success, or lack thereof, of players in general, and
African-American players specifically, was apparently not a factor in the contract extension.
When examining the bonuses available for academic and athletic performance, it is clear academics
are not a high priority and that these contracts are written with an understanding of good public
relations but not necessarily for serious academic reprioritization. For example, Oklahoma will pay Bob
Stoops an additional $100,000 for graduating 100 percent of his players. However, even teams from
academic powerhouses like Northwestern and Stanford only produce GSR scores in the high 80s to
low 90-percent range (Jackson, 2009). It seems safe to say that Stoops will never collect on this
provision of his contract, nor is pursuing it a likely objective of his. If Stoops was able to produce a 100
percent GSR, it would be a far greater feat than winning a national title on the field (which he has
already done), considering he has not had a GSR score higher than 52 percent in the last five years.
Even if he managed a 100 percent GSR score, he would hardly feel the bump in pay, due to its relative
value in his overall contract.
This study supported that until there is meaningful change in priorities in athletic departments, some
FBS coaches will continue to reap great financial rewards while having dismal graduation success

rates. Most disconcerting is that the graduation success rates of African-American players will continue
to be an afterthought, in spite of their obvious on-field contributions to these successful football
programs. The question remains whether university presidents and athletic directors really have the
fortitude to call for legitimate academic standards and true academic leadership from their coaches.
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